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Abstract
Does the enemy of my enemy become my friend? A growing litera-
ture on structural analysis of interstate relationships has tackled this old
question from the network perspective. However, the mechanism of long-
term change in the structure of cooperation and enmity has yet to be fully
understood. In search for a general explanation for the long-term evolu-
tion of interstate structure, we empirically examine the structural balance
theory which predicts that a signed network evolves toward a more “bal-
anced” structure where in many triangular relationships (i.e., triads) two
states tend to share a common enemy or three states cooperate with each
other. We investigate the network of alliances (positive edges) and rival-
ries (negative edges) between sovereign states and examine whether its
evolution from 1816 to 2009 can be explained by the structural balance
theory. We find the consistency with the structural balance theory dras-
tically changes over time. The empirical pattern follows the prediction by
the theory before the German unification in the nineteenth century and
after World War II while inconsistent in the middle period. This result
reveals the impact of the two historical events on the underlying mecha-
nism of network evolution. Moreover, the contrast with previous studies
of signed social networks that generally support the structural balance
theory indicates that international alliance and rivalry networks can be a
promising material to study novel mechanisms behind the time evolution
of signed networks.
Introduction
How does the structure of international cooperation and conflict change over
time? Does the international network evolves in a way that improves structural
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balance? Using the data of international alliances and rivalries from 1816 to
2009, we empirically examine whether the signed network of international coop-
eration and enmity and its evolution are characterized by the structural balance
hypothesis.
Network representation is a powerful tool to study complex social systems.
When we describe social systems with networks, it is common that edges rep-
resent positive relationships such as friendship or collaboration between actors.
However, negative relationships, such as conflict, dispute, and hostility, are also
essential parts of social relations, especially international relations. Signed net-
works is thus an important field of study of complex social systems [1].
International relations is a typical example of signed networks as some
sovereign states (i.e., countries) are friends while others are foes. Moreover,
they are time-evolving networks because international relations quickly turn
from cooperative to antagonistic and vice versa. Though such changes of their
relations have significant impacts on international security, underlying mecha-
nisms of the dynamics have not been fully understood.
A well-known theory for the evolution of signed networks is Heider’s struc-
tural balance theory, which was originally proposed in social psychology and
later formulated in network models (e.g., [2]). According to the structural bal-
ance theory, signed social networks evolve to increase balanced triads, in which
either the enemy of your enemy or the friend of your friend is your friend. In
other words, triads with zero or two negative edges are balanced (Figs. 1(a) and
1(b)), while those with one or three negative edges are imbalanced (Figs. 1(c)
and 1(d)), and balanced triads are expected to be more stable than imbalanced
ones.
The structural balance theory has not been fully tested in the long-term evo-
lution of interstate networks, while the theory is supported in various studies of
social networks of individuals and animals [3–5]. Only a few studies have mea-
sured the structural balance in international relations [6–8], which mainly focus
the post-World War II period. In this article, we examine a much longer period
(1816–2009) because we are interested in fundamental properties of international
relations as time-evolving signed networks rather than specific historical peri-
ods or events. Moreover, we define negative edges between states by interstate
rivalries in contrast with the previous studies in which negative edges repre-
sent military disputes or war occurrences [6–10]. Military disputes are neither
necessary conditions for nor an appropriate index of a sustained antagonistic
relationship between sovereign states. For example, the United States and the
Soviet Union were antagonistic during the Cold War even when they did not
directly engage in direct military clashes. Military clashes are short-term events
and states may or may not engage in overt military conflict events all the time
even if they are involved in a long-term sustain antagonistic relationships. Thus
the occurrence of military dispute events are not an ideal measurement of hos-
tile relationships among nations, especially for studying the long-term network
evolution. Therefore, we test whether the structural balance theory holds in
the evolution of signed networks of international relations over a longer period,
using a better measurement than existing studies.
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Figure 1: (a), (b) Balanced (+ + + and + − −) triads. (c), (d) Imbalanced
(+ +− and −−−) triads.
Methods and Materials
We construct the network of alliances and rivalries between sovereign states for
each year between 1816 and 2009. The networks are non-directed unweighted.
Nodes are sovereign states that existed in the year. We refer to the Corre-
lates of War Project, which lists sovereign states from 1816 to 2016, to identify
sovereign states [11]. Two nodes are connected via positive or negative edges
if corresponding two states jointly participated in at least one military alliance
or engaged in an interstate rivalry in the year, respectively. Following previous
studies [6,8], they are connected with a negative edge when the two states have
both an alliance and a rivalry.
We draw on the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset
[12] to identify military alliances. Though the ATOP dataset collects informa-
tion of various types of formal military alliances and treaties between states from
1815 to 2016, we use only offensive and defensive alliances to measure positive
edges because others (e.g., neutral and non-aggression treaties) do not always
indicate the cooperative relation between signatory states are strong enough. To
measure interstate rivalries, we refer to Dreyer and Thompson (2011) [13], who
identify pairs of states that regards each other as an enemy based on various
sources including official documents of the governments.
We compare the empirical network in each year with surrogate networks
obtained by shuffling the signs of edges (Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)). Connections
between nodes and the numbers of the positive edges and negative edges are held
identical between surrogate networks and the empirical one. The comparison
reveals whether the structural balance in a certain year is explained only by
the topology and the fraction of edge signs of the network in the year. The
structural balance theory expects that the empirical fraction of balanced triads
is significantly larger than the surrogate.
We also compare actual changes of the network in each year (empirical
growth) with randomized changes of the network, i.e., surrogate growth (Figs.
2(c) and 2(d)). On the one hand, when we randomize the changes of the net-
work, we conserve the numbers of edge state transitions between three states:
positive, negative, and absent. On the other hand, we randomly choose edges to
which the edge transitions realize to. Therefore, the comparison reveals whether
a given property of one-year growth of the network is simply explained by the
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Figure 2: Example of randomization of a signed network and its changes. Blue
solid lines are positive edges and red dashed lines are negative edges. The
network in (a) is an example of surrogates of the network in (b). Both have the
same topology and same number of positive and negative edges (four and six,
respectively). The network changes in (c) is an example of surrogates of the
network changes in (d). Both has the same numbers of edge state transitions:
one negative edge becomes absent, one positive edge becomes absent, one absent
edge becomes positive, one absent edge becomes negative, and one negative edge
becomes positive.
frequency of edge state transitions in the year.
Specifically, we compare triad state transition in the empirical and surrogate
growths of the networks. Triads are either imbalanced, open, or balanced (de-
noted hereafter by −1, 0,+1, respectively). Open triads have at least one pair
of nodes not connected, so they are neither balanced nor imbalanced. The triad
transition probability wi→j in year t is the probability that a triad in state i in
year t− 1 takes state j in year t, which satisfies
∑
j wi→j = 1.
Following the structural balance theory, we expect that: (1) imbalanced
triads are not stable and tend to change to open or balanced triads; (2) when
open triads become closed, they tend to be balanced rather than imbalanced;
(3) balanced triads are stable so tend to stay balanced without changing to
either open or imbalanced. Therefore, we expect: (1) w−1→+1 + w−1→0; (2)
w0→+1 − w0→−1; (3) w+1→+1 are larger in empirical data compared with the
surrogates. Note that we take the sub-networks of sovereign states which existed
in both year t−1 and t to measure edge and triad state transitions and generate
surrogates growth, because in this study we assume that emergence and demise
of sovereign states are out of the scope of the structural balance theory.
We employ z-score to evaluate the difference between empirical and surrogate
networks. The z-score of a variable is
z =
x− µ
σ
, (1)
where x is the empirical value of the variable, µ and σ are the mean and the
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standard deviation of the variable in surrogates. |z| > 2 is a benchmark for a
significant difference between empirical values and surrogate values, as z > 2
(z < 2) means the empirical value is significantly larger (smaller) than surro-
gates.
Results
First we find the static properties of the alliance and rivalry network are clearly
different across three periods, (1) 1816–1866, (2) 1867–1941, and (3) 1942–2009
(Fig. 3). While the number of nodes (sovereign states) tends to increase over
all the periods (Fig. 3(a)), the average degree drops in 1867 and jumps up
in 1942 (Fig. 3(b)). By the same token, the fraction of positive edges and
the fraction of balanced triads (Figs. 3(c) and 3(d), respectively) are constantly
high (i.e., positive edges and balanced triads are the majority) during 1816–1866
and 1942–2009, while both fractions suddenly drooped in 1867 and gradually
increased between until 1941. Thus, the balanced triads are not always the
majority and their fraction did not always increase. The pre-1867 and post-
1942 periods are quite different than the period in-between in terms of the
static nature of structural balance.
Fig. 4 shows typical networks in each period. The networks in 1855 and
1955 have clusters which densely connected by positive edges. The networks in
1955 is larger and have more clusters with positive edges compared with that in
1855. In contrast, the network in 1905 does not have clusters of positive edges,
it is sparser than the other two, and most of its edges are negative.
We further compare the fraction of balanced triads of the empirical network
in each year with surrogate networks in which signs of edges are randomly
shuffled without changing the topology of the empirical network (Fig. 5(a)).
During the first period (1816–1866) and third period (1942–2009), the fraction of
balanced triads is significantly larger than that of surrogate networks (|z| > 2),
which is consistent with the structural balance theory. On the other hand,
between 1867 and 1941, the difference between the empirical and the surrogate
in the second and third periods is much less clear (|z| < 2), therefore the support
for the structural balance theory is weaker in this period.
Next, we compare the growth of the networks in each year and its surrogate
growth for the year. Figs. 5(b)–(d) show z-scores of the three values, (b)
w−1→+1 +w−1→0, (c) w0→+1 −w0→−1, and (d) w+1→+1, to compare empirical
and surrogate growth. The structural balance theory posits that these values
should be larger in empirical data than in surrogates. Note that when no edge
state transitions are observed in the focal sub-network in the empirical date, we
cannot generate surrogates because there is nothing to randomize. Such years
are indicated with black circles in Figs. 5(b)–(d).
We again see that the support for the structural balance theory is different
over time. Open triads were likely to become balanced rather than imbalanced
in the early and especially the recent periods (Fig. 5(c)). On the other hand,
such tendency is not clear in the middle period as z-score only sometimes sat-
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Figure 3: (a) The number of nodes, (b) the average degree, (c) the fraction
of positive edges and (d) the fraction of balanced triads. Vertical dashed lines
indicate the end of the first period (1866) and the beginning of the last period
(1942).
Figure 4: Alliance and rivalry networks in (a) 1855, (b) 1905, and (c) 1955.
Node labels are the COW abbreviation of sovereign states’ names [11].
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isfies |z| > 2 and both z > 2 and z < −2 are observed with a similar frequency.
Balanced triads tended to stay balanced especially in the postwar period, but
not quite in earlier periods. Z scores larger than 2 are observed only sometimes
before the 1940’s (Fig. 5(d)). There is no concrete evidence that imbalanced
triads were likely to become either open or balanced as the theory predicts—
|z| hardly exceeded 2 except for a few years in the recent period (Fig. 5(b)).
Taken together, the comparison of empirical triad state transitions with surro-
gate growth expected from edge state transition supports the theory in the early
period and, more clearly, in the recent periods, while not in the middle period.
Figure 5: (a) Z-score of balanced triads between empirical and surrogate
networks. (b)–(d) Z-score between empirical and surrogate growth of (b)
w−1→+1 + w−1→0, (c) w0→+1 − w0→−1, and (d) w+1→+1. They are calculated
from 1,000 samples. Horizontal solid lines indicate |z| = 2. Vertical dashed lines
indicate the end of the first period (1866) and the beginning of the last period
(1942). Black filled circles indicate the years when no edge state transitions are
observed for the focal sub-networks.
Discussion
The changes of consistency with the structural balance theory coincided with
two important historical events: German unification in the nineteenth century
and World War II. This observation partly explains the abrupt changes of net-
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work characteristics. The “middle” period in our analysis (1867–1941) starts
with German unification and ends during World War II.
Shortly prior to German unification, Prussia defeated Austria in 1866 (Austro-
Prussian War) and annexed several small states such as Saxony and Hanover,
which had densely allied each other before the unification. In the language of
networks, nodes connected via dense positive edges and almost no negative edges
(therefore forming largely balanced triads) merged into one node. It resulted in
abrupt reduction in the fraction of positive edges and balanced triads. In the
interwar period and during World War II, both the Axis powers and the Allies
increased their alliances. The Allies defeated the Axis powers and “absorbed”
them (West Germany, Japan, and Italy) into the large Western alliance. The
fraction of positive edges and balanced triads increased first, in the interwar
period, by the formation of dense alliances within the two camps, and later in
the postwar period by the elimination of rivalries between the camps due to the
absorption of one camp by the other.
Moreover, our data analysis demonstrated that German unification and
World War II changed the dynamics of network evolution rather than merely
shifted network characteristics in the specific years. The period between these
events was quite distinct in that triadic interactions, i.e., the tendency toward
balanced triads are not observed beyond the expectation from random addition
and deletion of edges. This implies that international relations during the pe-
riod was mostly driven by dyadic motivations and interactions in which pairs
of states cooperate or confront over bilateral issues, while triadic (or poly-adic)
considerations on structural balance involving third parties did not strongly
drive international politics. On the other hand, changes of alliances and rival-
ries between two states were strongly influenced by considerations to enhance
balance in their relationships with others as the structural balance theory pre-
dicts before German unification or after World War II. Network analysis thus
provides this new insight into the impacts of the two historical events.
We make a contribution to network science by finding that international
alliance and rivalry networks can be a promising material to find novel dynamics
of signed networks. In contrast with our result, previous studies on signed
networks of individuals or animals are generally supportive to the structural
balance theory [3–5]. It can be partly because nodes do not merge by definition
in their case, while the merger of nodes seems to play an important role in
abruptly changing the consistency with the structural balance theory in our case.
Existing models of the structural balance theory also fixes the set of nodes [2],
while the split and merger of social groups, e.g., firms and political parties, are
common phenomena. Therefore, we conjecture interaction between structural
balance and merger of nodes into models can help to reproduce the long-time
evolution of signed networks, including the alliance and rivalry networks.
Note that some previous studies on structural balance of interstate relations
take longer cycles into account when measuring structural balance of signed
networks [6,8], e.g., whether the enemy of the enemy of your enemy is an enemy
or not. Though the current study focused on the structural balance of triads, the
long-time development of structural balance in longer cycles is also an interesting
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direction to expand.
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